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This paper investigates how families make decisions about the education of juveniles. The 
decision problem is analyzed in three variations: a ‘decentralized’ scheme, in which the 
parents control the purse-strings, but the children dispose of their time as they see fit; a 
‘hierarchical’ scheme, in which the parents can enforce a particular level of schooling by 
employing a monitoring technology; and the cooperative solution, in which the threat point is 
one of the two noncooperative outcomes. Adults choose which game is played. While the 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game is Pareto-efficient when viewed statically, it 
may yield less education than the hierarchical scheme. Regulation in the form of restrictions 
on child labor and compulsory schooling generally affects both the threat point and the 
feasible set of bargaining outcomes, and families may choose more schooling than the 
minimum required by law. 
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The importance of educating juveniles well is beyond dispute, not least because the
formation of human capital is crucial for economic growth. Here, the family plays a
central role. For the levels of education individuals have attained on reaching adulthood
are not the result of investment decisions made by a collection of rational Robinson
Crusoes; rather they reﬂect their families’ choices as they were growing up. This fact is
well-recognized in the literature that examines investment in education as the outcome
of family decision-making and its implications for economic development. In the usual
formulation, how much education the children receive basically depends on how much
the parents are able and willing to ﬁnance. Children have the same preferences as
their parents, or their parents can force them to go to school against their will without
exerting any eﬀort. In reality, however, the family faces a more complicated problem,
in that juveniles may have quite diﬀerent preferences from their parents, and how they
spend their time depends on what inducements their parents provide and their eﬀorts at
enforcement.1 Although conﬂicts between parents and their children due to diﬀerences
in preferences have been analyzed in the literature on the ‘rotten kid theorem’ and the
‘samaritan’s dilemma’ (Becker, 1974; Bergstrom 1989), there are no direct inferences
about the long-run consequences of diﬀerent ways of resolving the conﬂict.
The object of this paper is to combine these two strands of the literature in order to
examine how family decision-making aﬀects investment in education, and hence the
economy’s long-run growth, when juveniles may also devote their time to work or the
pursuit of leisure. As formulated here, parents care about current consumption and
their children’s future human capital, but the juveniles themselves are also keen on
‘fun’. Thus, juveniles may wish to play long and hard, even though their parents are
willing to ﬁnance a fuller education. It is also possible that the parents are keen to
consume, in which case the juveniles’ ability to earn, and so contribute to the common
pot, constitutes a reason for the former to deny them all the education they desire. As
in the literature on family decision-making and economic development, the trade-oﬀ
between education and work has a prominent place, but we go a step further by allowing
juveniles to allocate their time in ways that may run counter to their parents’ wishes.
This step towards realism enables us to arrive at interesting results on the connection
between the static resolution of the family’s conﬂict and its long-term consequences.
The decision problem is analyzed in three variations: ﬁrst, a ‘decentralized’ solution,
1Broadly related, though diﬀerent, bargaining problems arise between spouses. Pollak (2007)
provides an extensive account, with an emphasis on joint taxation.
3in which the parents control the purse-strings, but the children dispose of their time as
they see ﬁt, subject to their parents’ willingness to ﬁnance their choice of education;
second, a ‘hierarchical’ scheme, in which the parents can enforce, at some cost, more
schooling than their children desire; and third, the cooperative solution, in which the
threat point is one of the two noncooperative outcomes. The parents choose which game
is played. We prove that the sub-game perfect equilibrium almost always involves the
cooperative solution. The main result is that for some constellations of preferences
and technologies there exists a tradeoﬀ between static eﬃciency, which always holds
in a cooperative solution of the family’s current conﬂict, and long-run growth. The
reason is that in the hierarchical decision scheme, whose outcome is always pareto-
ineﬃcient, the parents possess the means to force their children to attend school, but
not to make them work, so that the latter might spend their time just hanging about
and having fun, which the parents do not value. Hence, if the parents have preferences
for schooling that are suﬃciently stronger than their children’s, but not too strong,
and the marginal costs of enforcement are not too high, they would choose extensive
schooling under hierarchy; but they would do still better in the bargaining outcome.
For the savings in enforcement costs would be enjoyed by both parties, partly in the
form of more consumption, with the juveniles contributing to the household’s budget
by working more in exchange for less schooling and perhaps some pocket money to
pursue fun, even if there were less time for it.
In this setting, it is natural to ask how legal restrictions on child labor and compulsory
schooling will aﬀect families’ decisions. If the main aim is to foster the formation of
human capital, the principle of targeting indicates that enforcing extensive schooling
is the right way to intervene. Our analysis reveals, however, that there are subtle
eﬀects of restrictions on child labor when juveniles can while away their time instead of
attending school: these restrictions can induce high levels of education, even when the
compulsory minimum does not bind. Joint regulation may, therefore, be advantageous.
There is a large literature on the economics of the family (for an overview, see Neuwirth
and Haider [2004]). The family’s role in educational decisions is usually emphasized
when there are borrowing constraints (Banerjee, 2003), especially in the context of
developing countries. As for the motives for such investments and who has the ﬁnal
say, whilst the assumption that parents are in charge of ﬁnancial decisions is almost
universal, there are various formulations of the parties’ utility functions. They range
from the parents and children sharing a single, uniﬁed utility function (Becker, 1981;
Loury, 1981) to that in which parents’ only incentive to lend to their children is because
the latter will care for them in old age (Cox, 1987; Cremer, Kessler and Pestieau, 1992;
4Barham et al., 1995; Cox and Jakubson, 1995). There are also formulations in which
parents have some altruism towards their children, expressed by the former putting
some weight on the latter’s income, consumption or human capital.
In the non-cooperative setting of this paper, the fundamental family conﬂict is also
related to the literature on the ‘rotten kid theorem’ and the ‘samaritan’s dilemma’. In
summary, in a sequential game with altruistic parents and a selﬁsh child, the parents
can achieve their ﬁrst-best by moving ﬁrst (samaritan’s dilemma) or last (rotten kid
theorem), whereby the right choice depends on the speciﬁc form of the utility functions
(see Dijkstra [2007] for a good overview). These problems are usually two-dimensional,
with each party deciding over one dimension. In most settings, the parents decide over
the level of an income transfer to the children, who control a variable that is often
interpreted as work eﬀort. The setting employed here, in which the parties dispose
of a variety of alternatives, is ﬁve-dimensional, with three degrees of freedom. It is
correspondingly richer in its implications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the family’s structure, endow-
ments, and activities. Its decision problem is set out in Section 3, in the three variations
described above, and the sub-game perfect equilibrium is characterized. The eﬀects of
legal restrictions on work and schooling are examined in Section 4, followed by a nu-
merical, illustrative example in Section 5. Some concluding remarks are drawn together
in Section 6.
2 The Structure
The youthful members2 of the family (identical juveniles) split their time among edu-
cation, e, work, w, and leisure, l. They consume an aggregate good directly, together
with a good that will be called ‘fun’, which is produced by combining inputs of leisure
and the aggregate good. They also have a certain say in family decision-making. Their
parents (the adults) work full time, consume only the aggregate good, and have their
say in family decision-making. The number of family members in group a(= 1,2) is
denoted by na, where there are n2 = 2 adults.3 Each member of the family is endowed
with one unit of time. A juvenile’s time budget therefore satisﬁes
e + l + w = 1, (e,l,w) ≥ 0, (1)
2According to the U.N.’s deﬁnition, ‘youth’ are those aged 12 to 24.
3In principle, we could also allow for the possibility that one parent dies before the children reach
puberty. As premature adult mortality is not the focus of the paper, we rule out such heterogeneity.
5there being no other way to use time. Let λa denote the human capital possessed by
a member of group a.
Three technologies are involved.
Assumption 1
The aggregate good is produced under constant returns to scale by means of human
capital alone, with the factor of proportionality α.
Assumption 2
The technology for producing fun is represented by
ζ = ζ(l,m), (2)
where m is the level of a youth’s complementary expenditure on the aggregate good,
all of which falls on the family budget, and the function ζ(·) is increasing, concave and
diﬀerentiable in both arguments. In contrast to pocket money, leisure is essential in
the production of fun: ζ(0,m) = 0 ∀m and ζ(l,0) > 0 ∀l > 0.
The third technology is that for producing human capital. In general, one can write the
level of human capital attained by juveniles when they will have reached full adulthood,
λ2






where Γ is an increasing, concave and diﬀerentiable function of e.
It is assumed that a social rule governs the distribution of the consumption of the
aggregate good within the family, with each juvenile receiving the ﬁxed fraction β of
an adult’s consumption level, c.4 Hence, the family’s budget constraint is
(2 + βn
1)c + (σe + αλ
1l + m)n




where σ is the cost (including the opportunity cost of a juvenile’s time) of full-time
education, (αλ1l + m) is the combined expenditure on fun made by each youthful
member, and the expression on the RHS is the family’s full income, measured in units
of the aggregate good. It should be remarked that in writing (4) as a strict equality,
4Note that future human capital plays no role in generating income today.
6we have ruled out free disposal of full income, for example, by making grants to other
families. To do otherwise would introduce another dimension to the parties’ action
spaces, thereby further complicating the analysis of the non-cooperative games, in
which the parents control the purse strings.
3 The Household’s Problem
The family has to choose an allocation, in the sense of choosing a feasible vector
(c,e,l,m,w). This means a tussle between the youthful members of the family and
their parents, for their interests are partly opposed. The outcome must respect the
household’s budget constraint (4) and the juveniles’ time budget (1). As both hold
with equality, there are eﬀectively three degrees of freedom. We assume that juveniles
have preferences over βc, ζ and λ2
+1, whereas their parents have preferences over c and
λ2
+1 alone. We further assume that their respective preferences can be represented by
increasing, strictly concave and diﬀerentiable utility functions Ua (a = 1,2), that all
goods are normal and the aggregate good is necessary in consumption.
In general, the possible solutions to the family’s problem take three forms: (i) a ‘de-
centralized equilibrium’, in which the parents control all expenditures on the aggregate
good and the juveniles decide how they will spend their time, subject to their parents’
willingness to ﬁnance the outlays on education; (ii) a ‘hierarchical’ decision scheme, in
which parents have some means of setting e directly when they regard the juveniles’
choice thereof as too low; and (iii) the Nash bargaining solution, which will be realized
only if both parties are willing to negotiate. Henceforth, these are denoted by D, H
and B, respectively. We assume that parents are free to choose between the ﬁrst two
arrangements, since they can decide whether they want to incur the costs of monitor-
ing and enforcing the level of the juveniles’ schooling. The household’s entire decision
process can therefore be depicted by the following overall game structure.
Stage 1: The parents decide among {D, H, B}.
Stage 2: If the parents chose B, bargaining will take place. Otherwise the parents’
choice of either D or H will be executed.
Stage 3: If bargaining fails to yield agreement, the parents decide between D and H
and their choice will be executed.
7In principle, D, H, and B are themselves games. Accordingly, the overall game can
be viewed as the decision process whereby the parents and the juveniles choose the
particular game they want to play in order to solve the household’s allocation problem.
By backward induction, the overall game is solved by both the parents and the juveniles
calculating the outcomes of D and H. The outcome that yields the parents the higher
level of utility is the threat point in the bargaining game, as the parents are free to
choose among the non-cooperative games in the event that bargaining fails. It is then
possible to determine the outcome of the cooperative game. Once the solutions to
D, H, and B have been determined, we are in a position to characterize the subgame
perfect equilibria of the overall game. For simplicity, we add the following assumption:
Assumption 4
If the parents are indiﬀerent between choosing B and one of the non-cooperative games,
they will go with the latter.
The reason for this assumption is that, in principle, the parents could always choose
B at stage 1 even if they already knew that bargaining would fail. This is because the
parents can still decide between D or H at the last stage and bargaining is assumed not
to involve any costs. Introducing a minimal cost of bargaining would have the same
eﬀect as assumption 4. We now have the following lemma:
Lemma 1
Under assumption 4, the parents’ ﬁrst-stage choice will be executed in every subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Proof. By assumption 4, the parents will choose B at the ﬁrst stage only if they prefer
the bargaining outcome to D or H and the juveniles will accept the bargaining out-
come. In this case, the bargaining solution will be implemented. In all other cases, the
parents’ ﬁrst-stage choice will be executed by deﬁnition. ￿
We now characterize the solution to the household’s problem, proceeding as described
above. In particular, we shall describe and solve the sub-games, D, H and B, and then
determine the outcome of the overall game.
Before turning to these sub-games, however, we can state the following result, which
is an immediate consequence of the assumption that the parents place no value on the
juveniles’ ‘fun’.
8Lemma 2
If parents have unfettered control over the purse strings, but juveniles decide how they
will spend their time no later than their parents decide how to spend the budget, then
in all non-cooperative arrangements with no repetitions of play, parents will grant no
allowances.
The consequences for the juveniles’ allocation of time depends crucially on the forms
of Ua(·) and ζ(·). Suppose, for example, that although the juveniles are keen on fun,
they spend no time having fun. The reason must lie in a suﬃciently strong degree
of complementarity between the size of the allowance and leisure in the production of
‘fun’. With substantial substitutability, however, juveniles will spend time in leisure
despite receiving no pocket money. Whether, and if so how much, juveniles work
depends on how their parents will respond to the resulting larger budget.
3.1 The ‘Decentralized’ Solution
Under this arrangement, the parents have control over the variables (c,m) and the
young are free to manage their own time (e,l,w), subject to the parents’ willingness to
ﬁnance e. We begin by demonstrating that this is not quite complete as a description
of their respective action spaces. The juveniles’ earnings increase the total amount that
the parents can allocate to all forms of expenditure. In particular, with control over
the purse strings, the parents are in a position to restrict the juveniles’ educational
choices. That being so, the actual outcome where e is concerned will be the minimum
of what juveniles want and what the parents are prepared to ﬁnance. The parents’
desired level of e is, moreover, a function of total income and hence of the juveniles’
working time. Thus, each party’s set of feasible actions depends on the other’s actual
action.
To establish why this may lead to a problem, consider the following example. Both
players move simultaneously, the parents maximize over (c,m) given (e,l,w), and the
juveniles over (e,l,w) given (c,m). Scrutiny of the juveniles’ decision problem reveals
that, if (c,m) is given, working will bring them nothing, so that they would spend their
time lounging about or going to school. As the game is one of common knowledge,
however, the juveniles know that by working they would contribute to total income;
and by Lemma 2, they also know that the parents will choose m = 0. Since both
players are assumed to be rational, the parents would respond to additional income,
given e, by increasing c. Under the usual assumption that both players’ rationality is
9common knowledge, this implies that the juveniles know that if they hold e constant
and substitute a certain amount of work for leisure, then (c,m) would change, which
contradicts the hypothesis that the juveniles take (c,m) as given when choosing (e,l,w).
These two issues require special attention when setting up the game structure. To
reﬂect the contribution of w to family income, we rewrite the budget constraint as
(2 + βn




1) ≡ y(w) (5)
where ˆ σ is the direct cost of full-time education, i.e., without the opportunity costs of
time. Observe that given (n1,2) and the social rule expressed by β, only two of c, e
and m can be chosen independently for each choice of w.
The problem of determining e is solved as follows. The juveniles decide on (e1,l,w)
subject to (1), and the parents choose (c,m) and the education level, e2, which they
would like the juveniles to achieve, given the available budget. If e1 ≤ e2, the outcome
is e = e1, as the adults cannot control e directly. If e1 > e2, however, the parents can
veto the juveniles’ education decision by refusing to ﬁnance it. These possibilities are
recognized by both parties before play commences.
The formal speciﬁcation of the game involves two stages, whereby the juveniles move
ﬁrst. If e1 ≤ e2, the parents accept the juveniles’ choice of e1. It follows at once from
(5) and Lemma 2 that they choose
(c,m) =
￿
y(w) − n1ˆ σe1
2 + βn1 ,0
￿
. (6)
At the ﬁrst stage, therefore, the juveniles’ decision problem is
max (e1, l, w) U1(βc,λ2
+1(e1),ζ)
s. t. (1), (6), (e1,l,w) ≥ 0.
(7)
Since U1(·),ζ(·) and Γ(·) are all concave functions and the constraints deﬁne a convex
feasible set, the solution to this problem is unique, and hence also is the solution of
this non-cooperative game. The assumption that the aggregate good is necessary in
consumption ensures that c > 0 at the juveniles’ optimum.5 To complete the charac-
terization of the solution, let e1 < 1 and w > 0, so that the corresponding ﬁrst-order
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1 ≥ 0, compl. (8)












αλ1 + ˆ σ
, e
1 ≥ 0, compl. (9)
where MRS1
1,2 denotes the marginal rate of substitution between the ﬁrst and second
arguments of U1, and the ratio of the marginal yield of schooling (in terms of future
human capital) to its combined direct and opportunity costs is adjusted by the claims
on the common pot where consumption is concerned.
If e2 < e1, where e1 solves problem (7), the parents can implement e2. Their decision
problem is
max(c, m, e2|e1, l, w) U2(c,λ2
+1(e2))
s. t. (5), (c,m,e2) ≥ 0.
(10)
The foregoing assumptions ensure that for each and every (e1, l, w), this problem has
a unique solution, with c > 0 and m = 0. Inspection of (5) with m = 0 reveals that
the upper frontier of the feasible set in the space of (c,λ2
+1) shifts parallel to the right
as w increases. The assumption that all goods are normal then ensures that λ2
+1, and
hence also e2(w), is increasing in w so long as e2(w) < e1.
With the ﬁrst stage in mind, we now introduce a further assumption:
Assumption 5
e2(w) is a concave function of w ∀e2(w) < e1.
The juveniles’ problem at the ﬁrst stage is now:
max (e1, l, w) U1(βc,λ2
+1(e1),ζ)
s. t. (1), (5), m = 0, e1 ≤ e2(w), (e1,l,w) ≥ 0.
(11)
Together with the earlier assumptions, assumption 5 ensures that the solution to this
problem, and hence the solution to this variant of the non-cooperative game, is unique.
It is clear that e1 = e2(w) holds at the optimum. In what follows, the solution to the
decentralized game will be denoted by (cd,md,ed,ld,wd), where md = 0.
113.2 The Hierarchical Decision Scheme
In addition to controlling just the purse strings, parents can try to control the time
spent at school directly, which is potentially attractive whenever e2 > e1 in D. The
drawback is that monitoring and enforcement are normally costly. Let k(e) denote the
costs of enforcing e for each juvenile. The budget constraint (5) becomes
(2 + βn
1)c + n
1(ˆ σe + k(e)) + n
1m = y(w). (12)
The hierarchical decision scheme diﬀers from D mainly in that the parents have the
possibility of ﬁxing the level of education at the ﬁrst stage, before the juveniles decide
on the allocation of the remainder of their time between leisure and work time at the
second. Finally, at the last stage, the parents split the budget net of education costs
between consumption and the allowance. By lemma 2, this structure implies that the
allowance is zero. Using the budget constraint, we obtain:
(c,m) =
￿
y(w) − n1(ˆ σe + k(e))
2 + βn1 ,0
￿
. (13)
Knowing that all the remaining budget will be consumed and they will not receive any
pocket-money, the juveniles solve the following problem at the second stage:
max (l, w) U1(βc,λ2
+1(e),ζ)
s. t. (1), (13), (w, l) ≥ 0.
(14)
The solution to this problem is leisure lh1(e) and work time wh1(e) as functions of the




s. t. c = (y(w) − n1(ˆ σe + k(e)))/(2 + βn1),
w = wh1(e), 0 ≤ e ≤ 1.
(15)
We impose restrictions on the juveniles’ preferences such that the following holds:
Assumption 6
wh1(e) is concave.7
6It is assumed that parents are unable to take out loans in order to ﬁnance education.
7The details of the associated conditions on U1 and ζ are available upon request.
12In view of the fact that the juveniles go to school voluntarily under the decentralized
arrangement, we make the following assumptions about k(·):
Assumption 7
k(e) is an increasing, convex and twice-diﬀerentiable function ∀e > e1, with k′(e1) = 0,
and k(e) = 0 otherwise.
It follows from assumption 6 and the convexity of k(·) that there is a unique solution
to problem (14). Let the solution to the game be denoted by (ch,mh,eh,lh,wh). Since
the aggregate good is necessary in consumption and y(0) > 0, ch > 0.
Of particular interest is whether the parents will choose eh > ed; for otherwise they
opt, in eﬀect, for the decentralized scheme, in which enforcement is unnecessary. The























≤ 0, e ≥ 0, compl. (16)
From (13),
∂c
∂y · y′ > 0, but dwh1/de is likely negative. Thus, whether eh > ed depends
not only on the parents’ preferences and the education and enforcement technologies,
but also on the juvenile’s preferences, which inﬂuence wh1. Analogously to the juveniles’








−αλ1 · dwh1/de + ˆ σ + k′ , e ≥ 0, compl. (17)
a comparison of which with (9) reveals that, for any given e, the adjusted ratio of
marginal pay-oﬀ to marginal cost here is not necessarily more favorable than under D.
Parents may, of course, have much stronger tastes for their children’s future capital
than the children themselves, which is precisely H’s attraction.
Observe that if Γ(λ2,e) satisﬁes the lower Inada condition with respect to e, then
eh > 0 is assured, but not eh > ed. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the
latter to hold is obtained as follows. Let the solution to problem (7) be denoted by
s1 = (c1,m1,e1,l1,w1), where (c1,m1) is given by (6). Then, recalling that k′(e1) = 0






















where all derivatives are evaluated at s1. For if ed < e1, the parents will have vetoed
13the juveniles’ choice of schooling under scheme D and so will choose eh = ed, with














This condition also determines whether parents prefer H to D, as we now demonstrate.
By choosing k = 0 under H, parents eﬀectively choose D and so obtain U2d. Since
k = 0 at e = e1, condition (19) implies that at the parents’ optimum under H, eh > ed,
and hence U2h > U2h(k = 0) = U2d. If condition (19) fails to hold, parents eﬀectively
choose D. This establishes
Proposition 1
Parents prefer H to D iﬀ condition (19) holds.
3.3 The Pareto-ineﬃciency of D and H
Non-cooperative games often yield pareto-ineﬃcient outcomes, and since the threat
point in the cooperative game arises from D or H as alternatives, it is important to
establish whether the latter are ineﬃcient in this sense. That the hierarchical decision
scheme is indeed so follows at once from the fact that the parents could allocate the
expenditures on control as pocket money to the juveniles or to the common consump-
tion pot, given that eh stays constant. That D is, in general, likewise is seen as follows.




1 s.t. (1), (5), U
2 ≥ ¯ U
2, (20)
where ¯ U2 can vary parametrically over some feasible interval. It is almost never the
case that the solution invariably involves m = 0, and whenever it does not, the outcome
under D will be pareto-ineﬃcient. To complete the argument, we examine the outcome
under D directly, when m = 0. It can be proved that, with very limited exceptions, it
is indeed pareto-ineﬃcient (see Appendix).
To summarize:
Proposition 2
All allocations under D are pareto-ineﬃcient under the assumptions set out above,
with the following exceptions:
(i) Unanimity on full-time child labor (e1 = e2(w = 1) = 0) is pareto-optimal.
14(ii) Unanimity on full-time education (e1 = e2 = 1) is pareto-optimal unless leisure and
pocket money are suﬃciently poor substitutes in producing fun.
(iii) If the juveniles just lounge about (l1 = 1) and the parents desire some education
(e2(w = 0) > 0), then the additional assumption that the |MRTS| between leisure and
pocket money in producing ‘fun’ at (l,w) = (1,0) is smaller than a juvenile’s marginal
productivity is strongly suﬃcient to ensure that this outcome is pareto-eﬃcient.
All allocations under H, which necessarily involves eh > e1, are pareto-ineﬃcient.
3.4 The Nash Bargaining Solution
A third possibility is that the allocation is the outcome of a bargaining game between
the two groups. The distinction between the direct costs of education and the time
actually spent in the classroom is a potentially important one where the description of
the game is concerned. If agreement can be reached on e, this implies that the adults
commit themselves to pay the corresponding fees and the juveniles not to play truant
once the fees have been paid, with each party taking the other’s commitment to be
credible. No monitoring is necessary, so that the set of feasible allocations is
S = {s ∈ R
5
+|s satisﬁes (1), (5)},









is the set of feasible utility pairs.8
The threat point plays a central role in the deﬁnition of any bargaining problem.
Since the adults may choose between the above two non-cooperative games in the
event that the negotiations are unsuccessful, their choice will determine the threat
point. Rational as they are, they will choose that which yields the higher level of
utility; for in the absence of any means to pre-commit themselves to one or the other
for the purposes of negotiation, this will be the best course of action should there
be no agreement. Denote by sd and sh the allocations chosen in the decentralized and
hierarchical decision schemes, respectively, and U2d and U2h the parents’ corresponding
8Since the utility and production functions are concave, X is convex.





(U1(sd),U2(sd)) , U2d ≥ U2h
(U1(sh),U2(sh)), U2d < U2h
where U2d = U2(sd) and U2h = U2(sh).
We are now in a position to deﬁne the bargaining problem:
Deﬁnition 1
(X,ξ) represents the bargaining problem between the juveniles and their parents.






















Let the parties’ respective gains from cooperation be denoted by U1+ ≡ U1(s) − x1ξ
and U2+ ≡ U2(s) − x2ξ, and observe that with the exceptions noted in Proposition 2,
there will be strictly positive gains for both parties.
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2+ − ν ≤ 0, l ≥ 0 (24)
µαn
1λ
1 − ν ≤ 0, w ≥ 0 (25)
where µ and ν are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (5) and (1) , respectively.9
9There are also pairs of complementary inequalities corresponding to the corner solutions involving
e = 1,l = 1 and w = 1, whose form is evident, and so omitted to save space.
16Since Ui is increasing in c (i = 1,2), it follows that µ > 0 at sn; for an increase in y(w)
can always be allocated to consumption of the aggregate good. For the same reason,
ν > 0 at sn, since an increase in the time available to juveniles can be allocated to
work, so raising y(w). That the lower Inada-condition holds for Ui with respect to
c (i = 1,2) and y(0) > 0 also imply that cn > 0, so that the ﬁrst part of (21) holds as














It is the weighted sum of the parties’ marginal utilities of consumption at sn, spread
over (2 + βn1) eﬀective consumers, where the weights are the other party’s gain from
cooperation.
Corner solutions for the remaining variables cannot be ruled out without further as-
sumptions. If a small investment in formal education at e = 0 produces a large enough
improvement in the juveniles’ human capital upon attaining adulthood, which both
parties value, then en > 0 and the ﬁrst part of (23) will hold as an equality at sn when
en < 1. Now suppose that ln > 0, so that ν follows from the ﬁrst part of (24). Recalling
from assumption 2 that pocket money is of no use unless l > 0, consider (ln,mn) > 0.
It then follows from (24) and (22) that |MRTSlm| = ν/µn1, so that if (∂λ2
+1/∂e)e=0 is


















1(ˆ σ + |MRTSlm|) = 0.
As a ﬁnal step, let wn > 0, so that there is a full interior solution, sn > 0. It follows
from (25) that ν = µαn1λ1 and hence that |MRTSlm| = αλ1, which is the market


















1(ˆ σ + αλ
1) = 0.
This states that the cost of a (small) unit of education, including the juveniles’ oppor-
tunity costs in the labor market, when multiplied by the shadow price of family income,
be equal to the weighted sum of the marginal utilities of human capital induced by
that unit of education.











This reveals that the change in a juvenile’s utility brought about by a little more leisure
time in the production of fun, when multiplied by the adults’ gain from cooperation,
must be equal to the shadow price of family income times the amount of the aggregate
forgone by working that much less.
3.5 Solution of the Overall Game
Having characterized the solutions of the (sub-)games D, H, and B, we are now in a
position to examine the solution of the overall game. From Lemma 1, we know that
the parents’ ﬁrst-stage choice will rule in a subgame perfect equilibrium. To determine
this choice, one must solve the overall game by backward induction. The ﬁrst step is to
determine the parents’ threat point in the bargaining game. Equivalently, we can ask,
when will parents resort to H if bargaining fails? Proposition 1 supplies the answer.
If, moreover, the parents do choose H, the juveniles will be worse oﬀ (U1h < U1d). For
under D, the latter are free to choose e1 and they do not have to share in the costs
of enforcing eh > e1. That U2h > U2d implies U1h < U1d enables us to say something
about the distribution of the gains from cooperation. If the parents choose H as their
threat in the event of a disagreement, they will also do better in the cooperative game
than if they were to choose D instead – a threat that is not credible in view of U2h > U2d.
As all players in the game possess perfect information, they know the outcomes of all
the games D, H, B; in particular, the parents know whether the juveniles would accept
the bargaining outcome. We can now state our main result:
Proposition 3
(i) The subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game is pareto-eﬃcient from a static
perspective.
(ii) H will never be implemented, D almost never.
(iii) The subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game may yield a lower level of
human capital formation than H.
The proof is given in the appendix. The intuition runs as follows. Parts (i) and (ii)
follow from the fact that if H and D are ineﬃcient, parents will choose the bargaining
outcome, for then both parties will be better oﬀ in B than in the non-cooperative games.
Hence, the overall outcome will be eﬃcient. As emphasized in part (iii), however,
18static eﬃciency does not necessarily yield the greatest possible dynamic gains, through
education. The result in (iii) stems from the fact that the only possibility for parents
directly to inﬂuence juveniles’ allocation of time is by forcing them to go to school. If,
for example, juveniles like to spend a lot of time in leisure – which adds nothing to the
parents’ utility – their parents can enforce time in education but not in work. In the
bargaining solution, the juveniles can oﬀer to work more at the expense of schooling.
If the parents’ preferences for consumption relative to the juveniles’ human capital are
suﬃciently strong, they will accept this oﬀer.
4 Regulation
Thus far, all decisions have been made free of any legal restrictions on how much
juveniles may work or the levels of their schooling. In aﬄuent countries, such work is
fairly strictly regulated, and compulsory education is likewise strongly enforced, so it
is interesting to examine the eﬀects of such restrictions, severally and jointly.
4.1 The labor market
Denote by ¯ w the legal upper limit of a juvenile’s working time. This will aﬀect the
outcome under D if and only if ed + ld > 1 − ¯ w. Since y(wd) > y(¯ w), at least one of c
and e must be lower. If the parents continue not to exercise their veto, the juveniles’

























2 + βn1 ,
where all terms are evaluated at w = ¯ w, with ζ = ζ(l,0). By hypothesis, the regula-
tion so reduces the feasible set in the space of (βc,λ2
+1(e),ζ(l,0)) that sd is no longer
attainable. Hence, given the normality of all goods, c will surely be lower if the regu-
lation binds suﬃciently tightly; and the fact that education involves direct as well as
opportunity costs works in favor of the juveniles increasing leisure more than school-
ing. Turning to the possibility that the parents would veto e1 in the absence of the
regulation, its introduction produces two eﬀects. On the one hand, there is an income
eﬀect which simply induces a reduction in e2 (= ed), so as to moderate the fall in c
that would otherwise result from the reduction in y. On the other hand, there is also a
substitution eﬀect which inﬂuences the opportunity costs of education for the parents.
19Without the regulation, the parents may have vetoed e1 because they knew that the
juveniles would then spend some additional time at work. When the labor restriction
binds, this is no longer possible, and the juveniles will spend the additional time in
leisure. In contrast to education, the juveniles’ leisure yields the parents no utility, so
this eﬀect works in favor of increasing e2.
Under H, the regulation will not bind if eh > 1 − ¯ w, since l ≥ 0; and hence it has
no eﬀect, provided eh > ed(w = ¯ w), as is very likely. If the regulation does bind, the
juveniles choose w = ¯ w and l ≥ 0, with the latter holding with equality iﬀ eh = 1 − ¯ w.
The parents therefore solve problem (15), with w = ¯ w and y = y(¯ w) < y(wh). As
before, the reduction in y will work in favor of a reduction in e, for both goods are
normal and this will lower outlays on enforcement, and so moderate the fall in c.
Against this, however, there is also the substitution eﬀect: now the juveniles just hang
about, whereas without the restriction, they spent some time at work. There is also
a direct enforcement cost eﬀect with respect to education. This eﬀect results from
changes in the juveniles’ voluntary school attendance in response to the restriction on
working. In principle, this eﬀect can go either way. Hence, whether education increases
or decreases under H as a result of labor regulation depends on the particular strength
of these three eﬀects.
Let H provide the threat point under B, regulation or no, and let eh > 1 − ¯ w and
en < eh in the absence of the regulation. Its imposition will aﬀect the outcome under
B if it causes the feasible set S to contract in the neighborhood of sn by limiting total
income to y(¯ w). By hypothesis, the threat point is unchanged, so that at least one
party will be worse oﬀ as a result. If the parents come out relatively better, this will
involve an increase in en at the expense of w and, possibly, l; for in such allocations, the
parents have relatively strong preferences for their children’s future human capital. It
should be remarked that with a complete ban on juvenile labor ( ¯ w = 0), the regulation
will bind in all subgames. If eh < 1, it follows that en( ¯ w) may exceed eh; for with
w = 0 and given the ﬁxed sharing rule for consumption, the only other adjustment
in the parents’ favor after the distribution of the savings in enforcement costs is for
juveniles to sacriﬁce some of their leisure time.
4.2 Schooling
The regulation is interesting only if the juveniles have some spare time to devote to
leisure or work; for otherwise the family would have no latitude of any kind, with
family income being ﬁxed, at y(0), and the residual after meeting the direct costs of
20education and enforcement, if any, going to consumption. Hence, we assume that the
compulsory level of education is ﬁxed at e < 1, with families enjoying the discretion to
choose more if they wish.
An immediate question is, who bears the costs of enforcing e, should this be necessary?
At one extreme, the authorities could charge parents with the task of enforcing e, with
the threat of severe sanctions if they do not. D is then no longer an option if ed < e, in
which event, the parents must make (unwilling) outlays of k(e) on enforcement. The
regulation has no eﬀect on the allocation under H if eh ≥ e; but if eh < e, complying
with it will entail additional outlays on enforcement. Hence, if ed < e or eh < e, we
have, by lemma 2, c = (y(w) − n1(ˆ σe + k(e))/(2 + βn1),e = e and m = 0.
The juveniles take this choice as given and solve
max (l,w) U1(c,λ2
+1,ζ)
s.t. (1), c = (y(w) − n1(ˆ σe + k(e))/(2 + βn1), e = e, m = 0, (l,w) ≥ 0.








(2 + βn1) · ∂ζ/∂l
αn1λ1 , (26)
where all derivatives are evaluated at the said values of (c,e,m).
At the other extreme, the school authorities could enforce at least e,10 with the family
bearing any additional costs under H if parents choose eh > e. Again, D in its unre-
stricted form is no longer an option if ed < e. Since ed < eh, it follows nevertheless
that if eh < e, the non-cooperative game is eﬀectively D, but with e = e and no en-
forcement costs for the family. The parents decide on the allocation of the net income
that remains after meeting the direct costs of education, which are non-discretionary,
and the juveniles how to allocate their time between work and leisure. By lemma 2,
m = 0 and c = (y(w)−ˆ σen1)/(2+βn1). The remainder of the solution is characterized
by (26), evaluated at these values of (c,e,m).
It must be borne in mind, however, that the fact that the authorities bear enforcement
costs in the amount of n1k(e) itself makes education yet more attractive to parents
under H, so that eh must be derived accordingly. In problem (15), we now have
c = (y(w) − n1(ˆ σe + k(e) − k(e))/(2 + βn1), with e ≥ e and m = 0. If the solution
10For simplicity, we ignore the fact that such public expenditures must be ﬁnanced by taxation.
21involves erh > e, it is quite possible that the ‘income eﬀect’ of n1k(e) results in erh > eh,
the level of e chosen under H in the absence of regulation. In any event, condition (26),
evaluated at the corresponding values of (c,e,m), continues to hold at the juveniles’
interior optimum.
We turn to the eﬀects of compulsory education on the parties’ utilities. If, in the
absence of regulation, the parents choose D and desire e2 > e1, they will welcome the
school authorities’ eﬀorts to enforce e, even if the family has to bear all the costs,
provided e does not go too far beyond e2. The juveniles will certainly be worse oﬀ as a
result. Thus, the parents’ bargaining position will be strengthened under B, and this
will normally lead to a higher level of en than that ruling in the absence of regulation,
even if en > e. If, instead, the parents choose H in the absence of regulation, with
eh < e, and the authorities bear the costs of enforcing e, the former still may be better
oﬀ under the regulation. The same holds for the juveniles, who will also beneﬁt in the
form of higher consumption, but the net eﬀect is still likely to be a strengthening of
the parents’ bargaining position under B.
It is clear that, under B, the eﬀects of imposing compulsory education stem in part
from its eﬀects, if any, on the threat point, even when the regulation does not bind
under B itself. If B is chosen, the solution is characterized by (21), (22), (24) and (25),
with e = e when the regulation binds; otherwise, (23) applies as before. Since the
agreement within the family is voluntary, there are no enforcement costs for any party,
even when the outcome without regulation would be en < e. In this connection, it
should be remarked that the regulation will not overturn proposition 2. If D is chosen
in the absence of regulation, with e2 > e1, and the school authorities bear the costs
of enforcing e (> e1), D with e = e will hold under the regulation. If, however, H is
chosen in the absence of regulation, with eh < e, the regulation will not necessarily
result in D with e = e; for ehr > e is compatible with eh < e. Recalling proposition 2,
compulsory education rules out full-time work and is irrelevant if there is unanimity on
the desirability of full-time education. The only remaining possibility involves ld = 1,
but that too is ruled out by e > 0.
4.3 Joint regulation
The level of compulsory education may be such that, despite the restrictions on juvenile
labour, both bind in one or more of the subgames. In that event, the juveniles will
have no eﬀective choices left, with l = 1−e− ¯ w ≥ 0, family income y(¯ w) is given, and
enforcement costs, if any, likewise. What, then, is there left to bargain over in B? The
22answer is m, and if l = 1 − e − ¯ w ≥ 0 and the threat point is pareto-ineﬃcient, the
juveniles will indeed enjoy some pocket money in the subgame perfect equilibrium.
4.4 Summary and discussion
A novel feature of our analysis is that juveniles desire leisure in order to have ‘fun’.
Where regulation is concerned, this adds eﬀects that are not present in the previous
literature on family decision-making and development. In the latter, it is oftentimes
emphasized that the negative income eﬀect of an upper limit on child labor may lead
to less schooling. By explicitly including the juveniles’ decision problem, we identify
additional eﬀects of limiting child labor, in particular, the substitution eﬀect and the
enforcement-cost eﬀect. As established above, and as the example in the next sec-
tion illustrates, these eﬀects are important when evaluating the eﬃciency of diﬀerent
measures such as banning child labor and compulsory schooling in fostering long-run
growth by promoting human capital formation.
The principle of targeting tells us that it is almost always optimal to attack a distortion
as close to its source as possible. If private decisions yield levels of schooling that
are deemed socially to be too low and, as here, the capital market plays no role, it
is therefore tempting to conclude that the right form of intervention is setting and
enforcing the desired level of compulsory education. At the same time, it is important
to note that although families almost always arrive at a cooperative solution (recall
Proposition 2), changes in regulation can also aﬀect the threat point and hence the
outcome under bargaining. A move to longer compulsory schooling, if fully enforced,
will necessarily increase actual schooling if families are currently choosing less; but by
inﬂuencing the threat point in the parents’ favor, the more stringent regulation may
increase schooling even when families’ current choices exceed the minimum it stipulates.
What role is left for child labor laws? None, if leisure is ruled out. In practice,
however, adolescents, in particular, ﬁnd various ways of spending time in leisure, so
that families have another margin to work with in response to changes in regulation.
We have established that tighter restrictions on child labor alone will have ambiguous
eﬀects on the level of schooling in the non-cooperative games. What counts, however,
is the ﬁnding that in the bargaining outcome, which almost always rules and in which
the juveniles normally enjoy some leisure, such restrictions may even lead to more
schooling than under hierarchy. For any contraction in the set of feasible allocations
that favors the parents will result in the juveniles sacriﬁcing some leisure, this being
the only margin left to them when they may not work as much as they would like.
23The above arguments take no heed of possible diﬀerences in the state’s costs of enforcing
the two forms of regulation, which must be ﬁnanced by taxation in some form or
other. The most eﬀective way to foster human capital formation and growth may
therefore involve the joint regulation of child labor and education, whereby the costs
of administration, subsidies and the taxes to pay for them must be integrated into the
analysis.
5 An Example
In this section we provide a numerical example to illustrate our results. The functional
forms for the production of human capital, the costs of enforcing education and the
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The following parameter values characterize our “standard scenario”. In particular,
note that the juveniles have stronger tastes for consumption than their parents (a1 >
a2).11
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The allocations in the three decision schemes in the standard scenario are given in
Table 1. Enjoying their freedom in D, the juveniles spend about two thirds of their
time in leisure and split the rest almost equally between education and work. In this
11In violation of assumption 2, ζ(0,m) > 0∀m > 0. In this section, however, all allocations involve
l > 0, so that the said condition plays no role.
24constellation, however, parents can do better under H, in which eh is much higher at
close to one-half, at the expense of juveniles’ time at play and, to a lesser extent, at
work. Enforcing this level of schooling claims 0.2301 of the aggregate good; together
with the partial loss of the juveniles’ earnings, the sacriﬁce of consumption is substan-
tial. In the bargaining solution, in which H constitutes the threat-point, the juveniles
agree to a sharp reduction in their leisure time and an even bigger increase in time at
work in exchange for some pocket money and a little less schooling than the rigors of
eh. It is also worth noting that the juveniles will not reach the utility level they would
have achieved in D, had that been available.
Table 1: Outcomes in the standard scenario
Scheme e k(e) w l m c U2 U1
D 0.1664 0 0.1749 0.6587 0 2.5053 2.2267 1.3537
H 0.4603 0.2301 0.1006 0.4391 0 2.1314 2.3669 1.2492
B 0.4069 0 0.4253 0.1679 0.0745 2.4649 2.4976 1.3380
Labor regulation takes the form of a complete ban ( ¯ w = 0). Under D, the juveniles
devote the time they would otherwise have spent working almost wholly to leisure, and
their parents do not veto the minimal increase in e1. The latter, however, continue to
do better under H, despite the loss of the juveniles’ earnings. Indeed, they step up eh,
with somewhat higher associated enforcement costs of 0.2794. Recalling section 4, this
increase arises from the changed opportunity costs of enforcement oﬀsetting the direct
income eﬀect, which by itself would lead to a lower eh. That the substitution eﬀect
is very large – under D, the juveniles would spend almost all of the additional time
in leisure, which yields the parents no utility – appears to be particularly relevant in
this example. Higher enforcement costs and parents’ preferences tilted more towards
consumption may result in a dominant income eﬀect and thus a lower education level
with labor regulation. To give such an example, let A = 1.5, κ = 1.1, and a2 = 2
3 :
these yield eh = 0.2232 without regulation and eh = 0.2213 with ¯ w = 0.
Table 2: Outcomes in the standard scenario with a ban on child labor
Scheme e k(e) w l m c U2 U1
D 0.1691 0 0 0.8309 0 2.3943 2.1811 1.3497
H 0.5147 0.2794 0 0.4854 0 2.0037 2.3353 1.2197
B 0.5513 0 0 0.4487 0.0340 2.1342 2.4366 1.3096
The outcome of the game is, as before, the allocation under B. With the juveniles
25unable to work, the only way for them to increase their parents’ utility is to agree to
more schooling: en now exceeds eh, and both are larger than their counterparts in the
absence of regulation. The savings in enforcement costs suﬃce to permit an increase
in consumption, and with so much leisure time at their disposal, the juveniles make
do with less pocket money than they would receive without the ban on working. Both
parties are worse oﬀ under the regulation.
Turning to compulsory schooling, let this stipulate the minimum level e = 0.5. Table
3 reports the outcomes both when there is direct enforcement of e by the state and
when the parents have to pay all enforcement costs. Note that when e exceeds the
level chosen in D and enforcement has to be provided by the parents, the imposition
of the regulation on the latter is identical to its imposition on H when eh < e. In this
particular constellation, only in H when the state enforces e does the level of education
exceed the required minimum. This accords with intuition, since part of the parents’
enforcement costs are then fully subsidized. Comparing these outcomes with those
without regulation, imposing higher education levels by assumption favors the parents,
whose ranking of D and H is left unchanged. The juveniles are worse oﬀ, except H
when e is enforced by the state. The parents’ tastes for consumption are suﬃciently
strong that the income eﬀect of the subsidy dampens the attractions of education so
much that the juveniles, whose tastes for consumption are stronger still, are more than
compensated. The actual outcome of the overall game is B under both arrangements
for bearing the costs of enforcement. In this constellation, this particular regulation is
welcomed by the parents, but it is a cause for complaints by the juveniles.
Table 3: Outcomes in the standard scenario with compulsory schooling (e ≥ e)
Scheme e k(e) w l m c U2 U1
e enforced by state
D 0.5 0 0.0409 0.4591 0 2.2131 2.4431 1.2940
H 0.5370 0.0191 0.0243 0.4378 0 2.1666 2.4455 1.2780
B 0.5 0 0.3301 0.1699 0.0755 2.3466 2.5157 1.3172
e enforced by parents
H 0.5 0.2678 0.0857 0.4144 0 2.0752 2.3658 1.2290
B 0.5 0 0.3336 0.1664 0.0730 2.3498 2.5174 1.3163
As argued in Section 4.4, no comparison of the two forms of regulation is complete
without a full speciﬁcation of the associated costs of implementing them. For ignoring
such costs, one could simply set e = 1, if the aim be to promote human capital formation
to the fullest – though the old saying that ‘all work and no play makes Jack (Jill) a
26dull boy (girl)’ suggests that a slightly milder regime is desirable. It is still interesting,
however, to examine the outcomes when the above regulations are jointly implemented
and the state enforces e = 0.5 directly, which are set out in Table 4. Joint regulation
promotes education still further, as the juveniles cannot evade education by working.
They are, morever, even worse oﬀ; and their parents would prefer to have compulsory
education alone. Note that if parents have to bear all enforcement costs, the outcomes
would be the same as in H and B in our example with the complete ban (¯ w = 0)
only.12 The reason is that under the ban, the parents will enforce education above e
voluntarily.
Table 4: Outcomes in the standard scenario with joint regulation ( ¯ w = 0, e = 0.5)
scheme e k(e) w l m c U2 U1
D 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 2.1875 2.4180 1.2937
H 0.6105 0.0711 0 0.3895 0 2.0730 2.4410 1.2422
B 0.6360 0 0 0.3630 0.0201 2.0899 2.4678 1.2761
6 Concluding remarks
How juveniles split their time among schooling, work and play involves a clash of
interests with their parents; for the parties almost surely have diﬀerent preferences,
whatever be the common bonds of family. The structure developed and analyzed
here places this clash at the center of the family’s allocation problem, which includes
choosing how much to produce of the household good we have called ‘fun’. Subject only
to the social ‘rule’ that juveniles receive a ﬁxed fraction of an adult’s consumption of the
aggregate good, the cooperative solution is always pareto-eﬃcient viewed statically; but
under the ‘hierarchical’ arrangement, in which the parents devote resources to enforce
their desired level of schooling, juveniles may receive more education, which will lead
to faster long-term growth.
This result depends on the assumption that in the absence of an agreement, parents
face prohibitively high costs of enforcing juveniles’ time at work, leaving enforcement
of schooling as the only option. In the bargaining solution, however, the parents’
enforcement costs are relevant only through their inﬂuence on the threat point, and
the structure of the relative costs of education and work time depends on the parties’
12Again, the decentralized decision eﬀectively drops out, because the parents have to enforce the
minimum education level.
27preferences. If the juveniles’ opportunity costs of a marginal unit of time at work
relative to one at school are lower than the relative enforcement costs in the hierarchical
scheme and the parents’ preferences for consumption are suﬃciently strong, though
weaker than the juveniles’, the outcome under bargaining will involve more work at
the expense of education. The assumption that parents ﬁnd it less costly to enforce
their children’s schooling than their time at work seems reasonable in many countries,
particularly those where there is a tight and strictly enforced cap on how much juveniles
may work. With a reversal of the parents’ costs of enforcing work relative to education,
the same line of argument yields the result that the bargaining solution is likely to
involve more time in school at the expense of work.
Our analysis also highlights another point. Even when a bargaining solution is avail-
able, it may not be realized if enforcement costs are so high as to make hierarchy less
attractive to parents than the decentralized alternative. For we have established that
the latter may be pareto-optimal, though the circumstances in which it is so are rather
limited. At all events, only if the costs of enforcing schooling are suﬃciently small
can one be sure that there will be a credible threat point to the cooperative solution
that leaves room for bargaining. Thus, the absolute level of enforcement costs plays a
role in determining whether bargaining – if available – actually takes place, whereas
the relative structure of the enforcement costs determines how the outcomes under
hierarchy and bargaining diﬀer.
The hierarchical scheme is always pareto-ineﬃcient, and if the decentralized scheme is
likewise, the outcome will be the bargaining solution. As argued in section 4, a change
in the enforcement technologies aﬀects the threat points of the cooperative game, but
not the feasible set of bargaining outcomes. Regulation in the form of restrictions on
child labor or compulsory schooling, in contrast, can aﬀect both. A ban on child labor
may reduce schooling in the non-cooperative schemes, but as the only means then left
to the juveniles is to agree to more education at the expense of their leisure, the ban
may lead to an increase in education in the bargaining solution, which actually rules.
Indeed, such a ban may well be more eﬀective in promoting education than a suﬃciently
modest level of compulsory schooling. For if juveniles are not eﬀectively restricted in
how much they may work, they can bargain for less schooling by oﬀering to work
more, with an outcome that may still comply with the minimum level of schooling.
This indicates that, in general, joint regulation is called for in order to foster fuller
education. Establishing the best form of regulation, however, requires that the costs
of administration, subsidies and the taxes to pay for them must be integrated into the
analysis. That is a task for another paper.
28Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
That the solution scheme H is ineﬃcient is established in the main text. Thus we only
have to consider parts (i)-(iii).
We begin with allocations in which no parental veto is exercised.
Case (a): 0 < e1 < e2. If, at the juveniles’ optimum, l > 0, they can always reduce
it slightly in favor of e1. This has only a second-order eﬀect on U1, but it yields a
ﬁrst-order improvement in U2. If l = 0, then w > 0. A small increase in e1 at the
expense of w will have only a second-order eﬀect on U1, but it will yield a ﬁrst-order
improvement in U2 by virtue of e2 > e1, which implies that the parents are willing to
sacriﬁce some current consumption in favor of education at e = e1 and given y(w).
Case (b): 0 < e1 = e2 < 1. There is agreement about e, but note that a small increase
in w at the expense of l will have only a second-order eﬀect on U1, while yielding a
ﬁrst-order improvement in U2.
Case (c): 0 = e1 < e2. If, at the juveniles’ optimum, 0 < l < 1, a small increase in w
will have only a second-order eﬀect on U1, but will yield a ﬁrst-order improvement in
U2. If l = 1, it suﬃces to show that e1 = m = w = 0 does not solve problem (20) when




. Writing down the ﬁrst-order conditions in the form

















where µ and ν are the multipliers associated with (1) and (5), respectively. Hence, if
the |MRTS| between leisure and pocket money in producing ‘fun’ at (1,0) is, in fact,
smaller than a juvenile’s marginal productivity, αλ1, we have a contradiction. Since
lounging about the whole day without any pocket money is not especially attractive,
imposing the condition |MRTS|l=1,m=0 < αλ1 does not seem very restrictive. Be that
as it may, we have established part (iii) of the proposition.
Case (d): e1 = e2 = 1. With l = w = 0 and both parties preferring λ2
+1 to consumption
at the margin deﬁned by e = 1, there is no way of improving one party’s position
without worsening the other’s unless the juveniles enjoy some fun, which involves l > 0,
and the parents enjoy more consumption, which involves w > 0, both to compensate for
the corresponding reduction in e1. Since, by hypothesis, the juveniles choose l = w = 0




involves m > 0 only if l and m are suﬃciently poor substitutes. Otherwise, e1 = e2 = 1
is pareto-optimal. This establishes part (ii) of the proposition.
We turn to the remaining allocations, in which the parents impose e = e2(w) at the
second stage and hence a (binding) constraint on the juveniles’ choices at the ﬁrst.
Case (e): e1 > e2 > 0. A small increase in e2 at the expense of c will have only
a second-order eﬀect on U2, but, by the envelope theorem, it will yield a ﬁrst-order
improvement in U1, with corresponding optimal adjustments in l and w.
Case (f): e2 = 0. If 1 > l > 0, a small reduction in l in favor of w will have only
a second-order eﬀect on U1, while yielding a ﬁrst-order improvement in U2. If l = 1
and e1 > 0, devoting a little time to work under the condition that the whole of the
proceeds go to ﬁnancing education would make the juveniles better oﬀ at no cost to
the parents. Such transfers are ruled out in D, however. Finally, in the extreme case
w = 1, the allocation is pareto-optimal. For l = 0 yields the largest feasible set from
the parents’ point of view, and if they desire e2 = 0 when w = 1, they cannot possibly
do better under any other arrangement; so that e1 = e2 = 0 solves problem (20) when




. This establishes part (i) of the proposition. ￿
B Proof of Proposition 3
(i) The bargaining solution will be implemented if and only if the threat point is
ineﬃcient. For if the threat point is eﬃcient, there is no possibility of making one
party better oﬀ without making the other worse oﬀ. If, on the other hand, the threat
point is ineﬃcient, both parties will gain from cooperation; for transfers of the aggregate
good are possible and perfectly divisible. Hence, B will always be agreed upon in such
a situation. As the Nash bargaining solution is pareto-optimal by deﬁnition and will
fail to be implemented only in situations in which the alternative non-cooperative game
yields an eﬃcient outcome, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game must
be pareto-optimal from a static perspective.
(ii) By proposition 2, H is not pareto-optimal. Hence, the parents never propose it at
the ﬁrst stage of the overall game, as they will be better oﬀ by bargaining. The same
applies, almost always, to D.
(iii) Let the constellation of preferences and technologies be such that the ﬁrst part
of (17) holds as an equality with eh = 1, where the derivative dwh1/de is evaluated
as e → 1 from below. If the juveniles have strong tastes for consumption, they will
30also cut back on leisure (without pocket money), if they had chosen any, as they are
forced to undergo more schooling when eh is close to 1. Hence, dwh1/de ≥ −1. In
such an allocation, the parents would also accept a very small increase in consumption,
ﬁnanced by the juveniles working a little bit at the expense of their education.
From (23) and (25), it is seen that the corresponding ﬁrst-order condition under B is
Ω ≡
U2+ · ∂U1/∂c + U1+ · ∂U2/∂c
U2+ · ∂U1/∂λ2







αλ1 + ˆ σ
, e ≤ 1, compl.
Observe that Ω > −MRS2
1,2 iﬀ −MRS1
1,2 > −MRS2
1,2. Substituting from (17) under





h = 1)) ·
(−αλ1 dwh1
de + ˆ σ + k′)e=1






,e ≤ 1, compl.
Now suppose also that en = 1, so that ln = wn = mn = 0. Since k(1) > 0, cn > ch
and hence −MRS2
1,2(sn(en = 1)) < −MRS2
1,2(sh(eh = 1)), though the diﬀerence will
be small if k(1) is suﬃciently small. If juveniles have suﬃciently strong tastes for con-
sumption (−MRS1
1,2 > −MRS2
1,2), Ω|e=1 > −MRS2
1,2(sn(en = 1)). Inspection of the
RHS of the above weak inequality reveals, however, that if k(1) and k′(1) are suﬃ-
ciently small, and (dwh1/de)e=1 exceeds −1 by a suﬃcient margin, this will contradict
Ω|e=1 > −MRS2
1,2(sn(en = 1)).
By continuity, the argument will also go through if eh is suﬃciently close to 1, or if, at
eh = 1, (17) holds as an inequality in reverse, provided the RHS exceeds −MRS2
1,2 by
a suﬃciently small margin. ￿
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